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Abstract
What would have happened if a relatively looser fisheries policy had been implemented in the European Union (EU)? Using
Bayesian methods a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model is estimated to assess the impact of the European
Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) on the economic performance of a Galician (north-west of Spain) fleet highly dependant on the
EU southern stock of hake. Our counterfactual analysis shows that if a less effective CFP had been implemented during the period
1986-2012, ‘fishing opportunities” would have increased, leading to an increase in labor hours of 4.87%. However, this increase in
fishing activity would have worsened the profitability of the fleet, dropping wages and rental price of capital by 6.79% and 0.88%,
respectively. Welfare would also be negatively affected since, in addition to the increase in hours worked, consumption would have
reduced by 0.59%.
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Classification: JEL Q22, Q28, C61; AMS 91B76, 92D25.
1. Introduction1
Within the European Union (EU), fisheries management pro-2
grams had follow a decentralized approach: while government3
agencies aimed to control fishing mortality, private fishing firms4
decided, based on the consequent fishing possibilities, their fish-5
ing effort and future capacity levels. These fishing possibilities,6
decided upon overall management objectives (e.g., Maximum7
Sustainable Yield, -MSY-), were converted into Member State8
(MS) shares using fixed share system and at a MS level dis-9
tributed among national fleets.10
EU fisheries had historically failed on maintaining healthy11
stocks. This was probably due to the lack of an efficient insti-12
tutional framework. However, a strong commitment on MSY13
objective set by the EU Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), had14
always forced a strategy of recovery of fish stocks (?). This15
recovery reduced the fishing possibilities of the fleets. On that16
sensea mayor complain from fishing firms was that the stock17
recovery caused the erosion of their financial profitability.18
The above is what we name the “folk theory”, that is the19
profitability erosion resulted from the reduction in fishing possi-20
bilities. This theory is not empty of arguments. The implemen-21
tation of input controls and the lack of efficient economic instru-22
ments (i.e., quota transferability) are arguments that from the23
economic point of view support this theory. Furthermore, while24
economic theory says that more healthy stocks can increase25
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profitability of the fishing firms, stock size recovery phases are26
less clear and if we look at the concrete case such as the Gali-27
cian (north-west of Spain) fleet, the evolution of the profitabil-28
ity is exactly as the one described in the “folk theory”: fewer29
vessels and lower financial profitability.30
It is complicate to evaluate this “folk theory” in a general31
way, because EU stock’s recoveries (when so) are divided into32
MS and fleet shares. These shares, defined based on historical33
catch records coming from the period 1973-1978 (the so-called34
relative stability principle), have diverged from the fishing ca-35
pacity of the fleets in such a way that a chronic misalignment of36
fleet’s fishing capacity and their fishing possibilities had been37
observed, in general, in EU fisheries (?).38
There are several exceptions to that partitioning of the stock39
recovery. When Spain and Portugal entered the EU in the year40
1986, the so-called southern management stocks were defined.41
These management stocks, while questionable from the ecosys-42
tem point of view, created the possibility to these two MS of43
managing their own stocks without the compromise of a share44
that had to be distributed among other MS. Essentially, these45
two MS were able to take advantage, alone, of the productiv-46
ity of the southern stocks. Not surprisingly, these stocks have47
always been in a wrong shape compared to their management48
objective. This increased the number of biomass recovery pro-49
grams, echoing the “folk theory”.50
This was the case of the southern stock of hake recovery51
plan (?), which controlled total allowable catches (TACs) in or-52
der to recover the spawning stock of biomass. Other plans for53
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this stock aimed to regulate (limit) the maximum number of54
days at sea per vessel (?) to reduce the fishing mortality. But55
the fleet reacted, adapting their fishing effort and capacity to56
these plans, and the consequences were that these stocks did57
not met their management objectives, stagnating “folk theory”.58
However, given the capacity of these MS to take advan-59
tage of the productivity of the stock, without a big compromise60
in terms of how this productivity has to be shared, creates a61
relevant analytical framework to evaluate these recoveries pol-62
icy and furthermore, the fleet behavioral response to this pol-63
icy, from the fleet’s capturing this stock’s productivity, point of64
view.65
Given the decentralized fishery policy followed in the EU,66
single planner frameworks are not appropriated to describe fleet67
responses (??). Therefore, decentralized fisheries models have68
to be built, where forward looking economic agents react to69
fisheries management programs based on optimizing individ-70
ual behavior. This is why in this work we chose a Dynamic71
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model. This model ex-72
plains aggregate economic phenomena build on explicit micro-73
foundations involving rational and forward looking optimizing74
behavior of individual economic agents (?). When this model75
is estimated, policy shocks can be isolated from the historical76
disturbances that may have affected the economy.77
In this work, the estimation of the proposed model allows78
to assess the effects of the recovery plan boosted by the CFP79
on the fishery. Furthermore, the estimated model can be used80
to build counterfactual situations that can be compared to the81
real impact of the CFP on the fleet. In that sense, a counter-82
factual scenario is built to analyze what would have happened83
if a relatively looser recovery policy would have been applied84
on the rebuilding strategy of the southern hake. In other words,85
the main aim of this work is to show if “folk theory” can be86
sustained by an economic model or not.87
2. Material and methods88
2.1. Model89
It is assumed that the economy is formed by four types of90
agents: households, firms, vessels and the regulatory authority91
that in our context represents the EU.92
We consider that regulation acts as a technological con-93
straint that can be embedded in the model by including a lottery94
in household preferences (??). Essentially, instead of choosing95
the number of fishing days, households choose a probability of96
fishing. This lottery framework enables the household’s prefer-97
ences to be written as a function of an exogenous parameter zt98
that measures how the regulation on the maximum number of99
days at sea affects to households preferences. We assume that100
the policy implemented can be summarized by the following101
stochastic process:102
zt+1 = (1 + γ)zt + εz,t+1,
where γ is an exogenous expected trend and εz,t+1 represents103
a white noise. Household’s welfare is measured in terms of104
utility. The representative household derives utility from con-105
sumption, Ct and desutility from labor, Lt. Income from wages106
earned, wtLt, and rental rates of physical capital RtKt, are used107
by households to purchase the consumption good and invest, It,108
in productive capital. Formally, the representative household109
selects its lifetime consumption and labor supply paths by solv-110
ing the following intertemporal decision problem,111
max
{Ct ,Lt ,Kt+1}∞t=0
Et
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
log Ct − ezt BLt} ,
s.t Ct + It = RtKt + wtLt,
Kt+1 = (1 − eεδ,t+1δ)Kt + It,
zt+1 = (1 + γ)zt + εz,t+1,
where Et represents the expectation given the available infor-112
mation at period t, B is the weight of the labor in terms of con-113
sumption, β is the discount factor, δ is the capital depreciation114
rate and Rt = rt + δ is the gross capital rental rate. εδ,t+1 is an115
unexpected shock affecting capital depreciation.116
Note that zt is the policy variable that indirectly regulates117
the maximum number of days at sea for vessels. Therefore,118
an unexpected positive (negative) policy shock, εz,t+1, has to119
be understood as a reduction on the maximum number of days120
at sea and that implies an increase (reduction) in household’s121
desutility due to labor.122
Firms produce the planned added value of the economy, Yt,123
with a Cobb-Douglas technology that uses labor and physical124
capital as inputs. Formally, firms chooses the input amounts125
that minimize costs such that:126
min
Lt ,Kt
Et {wtLt + eεr,t+1 rtKt} s.t. Yt ≤ AtKαt L1−αt ,
where At is the total factor productivity (TFP) and εr,t+1 repre-127
sent unexpected shocks affecting the price of physical capital.128
Note that technology serves to split the added value among the129
labor and capital income, representing α the capital share of the130
added value.131
On the other hand, vessels select the fishing effort, Ft that132
allow them to land captures, YBt , compatible with the planned133
added value. Formally, Ft is selected having into account the ?134
capture function, i.e.135
min
Ft
(
YBt − Yt
)2
s.t. YBt =
A∑
a=1
wa
paFt
m + paFt
(Na,t − Na+1,t+1),
where Na,t represents the fish abundance of age a = 1...., A at136
time t, wa pa are the average weight and the selectivity param-137
eter of age a, respectively, and m is the natural mortality that138
does not depend on age.139
Finally, we assume that the TFP of the economy, At, is re-140
lated with the size of the fishery stock. Formally,141
At = θt
 A∑
a=1
waNa,t
αstock ,
2
Table 1: Bayesian estimation for the Southern Stock of Hake
parameters prior mean post. mean 90% HPD interval prior pstdev
ρ (recruitment persistence) 0.900 0.4585 0.2493 0.6182 invg Inf
αstock (stock productivity) 0.149 0.8526 0.7199 0.9475 invg Inf
B (labor weight) 5.595 3.1238 2.8523 3.4443 invg Inf
γ (exogenous trend) -0.010 -0.2125 -0.3732 -0.0393 norm 0.2000
standard deviation of shocks prior mean post. mean 90% HPD interval prior pstdev
εz (policy) 0.010 0.1922 0.1455 0.2419 invg Inf
εr (rental capital) 0.010 0.0060 0.0023 0.0096 invg Inf
θ (TFP) 1.000 0.2258 0.1716 0.2727 invg Inf
εδ (capital depreciation) 0.010 1.3013 0.9460 1.6794 invg Inf
ε1 (mortality age 1) 0.010 0.4001 0.3225 0.4748 invg Inf
ε2 (mortality age 2) 0.010 0.1057 0.0835 0.1264 invg Inf
ε3 (mortality age 3) 0.010 0.3684 0.2979 0.4296 invg Inf
ε4 (mortality age 4) 0.010 0.1273 0.0996 0.1550 invg Inf
ε5 (mortality age 5) 0.010 0.0857 0.0647 0.1047 invg Inf
ε6 (mortality age 6) 0.010 0.1519 0.1137 0.1907 invg Inf
ε7 (mortality age 7) 0.010 2.1096 1.4206 2.7207 invg Inf
invg: Inverse Gamma distribution; norm: Normal distribution
where the parameter θt represent TFP shocks due by other fac-142
tors than those affecting stock abundance and αstock is the TFP143
elasticity. The biological model is completed with the dynamics144
of the resource. We consider that the stock evolves according to145
an age-structured population model where abundance is given146
by147
Na+1,t+1 = e−(m+paFt)+εa,t+1 Na,t,
where εa,t+1 represents an unexpected shock affecting to the to-148
tal mortality rate of age a. Note that total mortality rate is de-149
composed into natural mortality m and fishing mortality, paFt +150
εa,t+1, being pa the selectivity parameter for age a. Moreover,151
recruitment (in logarithm terms) is modeled as a 1-lag autore-152
gressive process153
log N1,t+1 = (1 − ρ) log N1 + ρ log N1,t + ε1,t+1,
where ρ is the autocorrelation parameter and N1 is the mean154
recruitment.155
The solution of this DSGE model is solved using standard156
numerical methods for solving forward looking models with ra-157
tional expectations based on algorithms that linearizes the sys-158
tem around the steady state (?).159
2.2. Bayesian estimation160
The model is applied to the Galician trawl fleet which is161
highly dependent on the southern stock of hake (?). This fleet162
operates in the Atlantic Iberian waters (limited in the north-163
east by the Spanish-French border and in the south-west by the164
Straits of Gibraltar).165
The calibration of the model consists of keeping some pa-166
rameters fixed and estimating those related to the model dy-167
namics with Bayesian techniques. In particular, we keep fixed168
parameters from the technology of production: factor shares,169
α, depreciation of physical capital, δ, and parameters from the170
Baranov capture equation, pa and m. We estimate those pa-171
rameters related to i) recruitment dynamics (ρ and the standard172
deviation of ε1,t), ii) abundance dynamics (standard deviations173
of εa,t), iii) policy dynamics (B, γ and the standard deviation of174
εz,t), iv) TFP elasticity, αstock and, v) capital rental rate (stan-175
dard deviations of εr,t).176
The biological population data and technological (Baranov)177
parameters are extracted from ?. The factor share, α, is set178
equal to 1/3 following ? and capital depretation, δ, is selected179
equal to 12,90% to match fixed capital allowances from ?.180
The Bayesian estimation of ρ, αstock, B and γ (carried out181
using the software Dynare, see ?) involves combining the es-182
timation of the parameters by maximum likelihood using an183
observed set of data with the information obtained from prior184
distributions defined for those same parameters. The data set185
used includes yearly observations of abundance for seven ages,186
Na for a = 1, ...7, landings, Y , labor, L, fishing mortality, F,187
and physical capital, K. The prior distributions used for the188
estimation follows the standard practice in DSGE models. In189
particular, we use as priors the parameters calibrated to match190
long-run averages, i.e. steady state with γ = 0.191
The biological time series data (1982-2012) refers to the192
southern stock of hake ( Merluccius merluccius, coded as HKE).193
Data were normalized using the sample median. Fishing mor-194
tality and landings comes from (?). The capital and labour time195
series (2004-2012) are built using data from Galician Statistics196
Institute (?) and from the Spanish Fishery Economic Survey197
(?).198
The steady state of the model was computed assuming a199
capital output ratio, K/Y , equal to 2 and normalizing labor in200
2004 equal to 1/3. Finally we assumed Inverse Gamma prior201
distributions for non-negative parameters (like the standard de-202
viations of the shock processes) and prior Normal distribution203
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Figure 1: Priors and posteriors. Black (grey) line represents the posterior (prior), green vertical line represents the posterior mode value distribution of the standard
deviation of the policy shocks associated with CFP, εz, the other (economic and biological) shocks (εr , θ, εδ {εa}71) and of the recruitment AR process (ρ), the stock
productivity (αstock), the exogenous labor desutility (B) and its trend parameter (γ).
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Figure 2: Historical and smoothed variables. The data set used includes yearly observations (1982-2012) of abundance for seven ages, Na for a = 1, ...7, landings,
Y , labor, L, fishing mortality, F, and physical capital, K. Black (red) line represents the ‘’true” (estimated) time series.
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Figure 3: Impulse response function: the fishery’s reaction to the impact of a 1% reduction into εz on landings, Y , consumption, C, investment, I, physical capital,
K, labor, L, wages, W, gross capital rental rate, R, total factor productivity, A, and fishing mortality, F.
for the policy coefficient, γ. Table ?? show the priors and the204
posterior modes of the main parameters of interest.205
Comparing the posterior estimates with the priors is infor-206
mative. The posterior distributions estimated (black line with207
the green vertical line representing the posterior modal value)208
depart substantially from the assumed prior distributions (grey209
line). Figure ?? shows that priors and posteriors distributions of210
the stock productivity (αstock), the exogenous labor desutility211
(B) and its trend parameter (γ), and the recruitment AR pro-212
cess (ρ) present large departures indicating that the information213
content of the aggregated data is very informative. Figure ??214
compares the evolution of the series used (the “true time series)215
with that generated by the model for the same variables.216
In order to understand how the model works in terms of217
policy, we present the impulse response functions associated to218
the effects of a policy shock, εz. In particular, we study the219
fishery’s reaction to the impact of a 1% reduction into the max-220
imum number of days at sea per vessel. Figure ?? shows that221
decreasing the maximum number of days at sea per vessel (by222
increasing zt with a positive shock in εz), as expected, depresses223
value added, Yt, consumption, Ct, investment It, total employ-224
ment, Lt, and capital, Kt in the short run. On one hand, the225
reduction on the hired labor, makes this input more productive226
leading to an increase on wages. On the other hand, a reduc-227
tion on the maximum number of days at see drops substantially228
fishing mortality, F, and this affects positively the abundance of229
the stock, Nt, for all ages (not shown in the figure). As a result,230
TFP of the fishery, At = θt
(∑7
a=1 waNa,t
)αstock, increases ac-231
cordingly leading to a substantial recovery of the future added232
value, consumption, investment and profitability, Rt, of the fish-233
ery.234
3. Results235
The observed evolution of the fleet performance during the236
period 1982-2012 is the result of two factors: the economic and237
biological shocks hitting the economy (S = εr, θ, εδ, {εa}71) and238
the policy shocks associated to the CFP, εz. Both elements are239
inextricably connected and it is not possible to decompose the240
observable time series as the sum of the two effects (shocks plus241
policy).242
However, it is possible to use the estimated proposed model243
to measure the effects due to, exclusively, policy shocks by sim-244
ulating counterfactual situations. In particular, we compare the245
observed path variables for the period 1982-2012 with the simu-246
lated path variables that would have happened under a different247
policy shocks path.248
Formally, let {yt(εz,t,St)}2012t=1982 represent the path of fishery’s
observable variables as a function of the policy shocks εz and
the remaining historical exogenous shocks hitting the fishery, S,
for the analyzed period. Lets define now a counterfactual situa-
tion with a different path of policy shocks for the period 1986-
2005 that represents a 10% increase in the maximum number of
days with respect to the original policy, everything else equal,
{εˆz,t}2012t=1986. Since an increase in the maximum number of days
is given by a negative policy shock, every new period shock is
taken as
εˆz,t = εz,t − 0.10 × ‖εz,t‖.
Note that this counterfactual analysis, considers different policy249
shocks from 1986 on, that correspond to the period in which the250
CFP applies to the Galician fleet (Spain entered int he EU in the251
year 1986).252
Once the counterfactual is defined, the estimated model is253
used to simulate the fishery’s variables associated to the alterna-254
tive policy shocks, {yt(εˆz,t,St)}2012t=1986. Therefore, by comparing255
these counterfactual paths, {yt(εˆz,t,St)}2012t=1986, with the historical256
ones, {yt(εz,t, St)}2005t=1986, we can measure how the fishery’s vari-257
ables have been affected exclusively by a policy shock associ-258
ated to the CFP.259
Before investigating the model predictions of the impact of260
the CFP on the Galician fleet, we highlight the time series ob-261
tained from the estimation process for the policy variable, zt.262
Figure ?? shows two well defined regimes for the historical263
path (black paths): before and after 2005 which is the date in264
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Figure 4: Counterfactual analysis: Red line represents time series associated with a less restrictive policy in the maximum number of days, {yt(εˆz,t , St)}, and black
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which the recovery plan came into effect in the Southern Stock265
of hake.266
Figure ?? illustrates that zt exhibits a decreasing trend rep-267
resenting a situation compatible with an increase in the total268
number of days at sea for the period 1986-2005. Along that pe-269
riod, historical policy shocks increased the marginal utility of270
labor, ezt B, leading to a 50% increase in labor hours, Lt. This271
increase in the total number of days, affected negatively the272
stock, decreasing its abundance for all ages, Na, and the TFP,273
A. This lower resource productivity generates lower wages, wt,274
and rental prices, rt. As a result, consumption also decreased.275
Therefore, the estimated model considers that the underlying276
increase trend in the total number of days at sea between 1986277
and 2005, leaded to a deterioration of the financial results of278
the fleet. These historical paths are consistent with the lack of279
enforcement of the CFP provided by ?.280
The behavior of the policy variable zt turn over after 2005,281
when the recovery plan started. Paths displayed in Figure ?? are282
compatible with an increase in the total number of days at sea283
(i.e with a decreasing trend of zt) from 2005 on. This reduced284
the marginal utility of labor, ezt B, and as result total labor hours,285
Lt decreased dramatically. This decreasing trend of the total286
number of days, affected positively the stock, increasing abun-287
dance for all ages, Na, and TFP, A. The higher resource pro-288
ductivity generated higher wages, wt, and rental prices, rt. As a289
result, consumption increased. Therefore, the estimated model290
consider that the decreasing trend in total number of days be-291
tween 2005 and 2012 improved the financial results of the fleet.292
The historical and counterfactual fleet behavior are com-
pared by computing the ratio
yt(εˆz,t,St)
yt(εz,t,St)
.
The counterfactual value is higher (lower) than the historical293
value when the ratio is higher (lower) than 1. Figure ?? dis-294
plays this ratio for all the variables. Our counterfactual analysis295
shows that a policy equivalent to increase 10% the maximum296
number of days at sea would have increased the labor hours (L)297
and in fishing mortality, (Ft), for the whole period 1986-2012298
and it would have reduced wages (w), TFP (A) and consump-299
tion (C). Patterns are not so clear when production (Y), capital300
(K), rental price of capital (r) are analyzed. Table ?? shows the301
average counterfactual ratios of all the variables.302
Summarizing, the counterfactual analysis shows that relax-303
ing the enforcement of the CFP during the period 1986-2012304
would have worsened the economic results of the fleet by low-305
ering wages and rental price of capital, in average, 6.79% and306
0.88%, respectively. Economic agents would be affected nega-307
tively since labor would be increased 4.87% and consumption308
would be reduced 0.59%. Also the resource would have suf-309
fered the looser policy increasing the fishing mortality 5.02%310
and reducing the TFP 4.37%311
4. Discussion and conclusions312
Economic modeling literature addressing management of313
renewable resource under uncertainty (???) was criticized by314
Table 2: Counterfactual Effects Ratio
Variable Ratio (%)
yt(εˆz,t ,St)
yt(εz,t),St) × 100
Output (Y) 99.60
Consumption (C) 99.41
Capital (K) 100.46
Labor (L) 104.87
Wages (w) 93.11
Rental Price (r) 99.11
TFP (A) 95.63
Fishing Mortality (F) 105.03
biological modelers for their inadequate treatment of realistic315
biological dynamics and uncertainties. As a result, in practice,316
fisheries management government agencies manage fish stocks317
by the advice provided using biological models based on simu-318
lation methods (??).319
After ? showed that age-structured fishery models repre-320
senting single planners were analytically tractable, optimization321
methods have been introduced in biological models to assess322
fisheries (???????????).323
In this work this optimization view of fisheries models is324
extended to a DSGE approach. In particular, a DSGE model325
is used to build a decentralized fishery where rational and for-326
ward looking economic agents react to fisheries management327
programs. Using bayesian methods the model is estimated to328
assess the impact of the CFP on the economic performance of329
the Galician trawl fleet fishing the southern stock of hake. This330
approach complements previous studies that also had analyzed331
the performance of this fishery in the context of the CFP regu-332
lations (????).333
From the policy point of view, the main advantage of the334
DSGE approach presented here is that once the model is esti-335
mated, counterfactual situations can be simulated. This enables336
the policy shocks to be isolated from the historical disturbances337
that may have affected the economy. This is the main reason338
why DSGE models, with a special emphasis on bayesian meth-339
ods, have become the main tool for policy analysis at central340
banks (????). Our study takes advantage of this feature to ad-341
dress fisheries policy issues with this methodological approach.342
Did the CFP reduced the economic performance of the Gali-343
cian fleet? This is not a simple question. The implicit pes-344
simistic view on the question is supported by studies that ana-345
lyze the CFP under dimensions so diverse as the restrictions on346
the tradeability of quotas, (?), the stakeholder engagement (?),347
the lack of considering unobserved genetic diversity (?) or the348
use of moratorium as management tool (?). In this diverse con-349
text, our study focus on the impact of the CFP on the produc-350
tivity of the fleet to answer the question. We obtain that, when351
we take into account an endogenous productivity, if a looser352
CFP had been implemented during the period 1986-2012, the353
income obtained by the owners of the vessels and crews would354
not have increased. That is, we show how the “folk theory” it355
7
is not necesarilly met in this ilustration.356
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